Response by Nelson, Jim
kinds of research which might benefit one's RESPONSE 
child would, unfortunately, involve a gross 
injustice to others and, therefore, should 
not be done is not to turn one's back on 
his/her child. Doing' the best for one's 
child within the limitations irclp)sed by being 
fair to others is one way of balancing par­
ental and impartial obligations. 
The weakness of these three reasons 
seems so clear when they are oonsidered in 
isolation from Nelson's third reason-that 
death may be a greater harm to a human than 
to an animal-that it must be this third 
reason which is C'.arrying the burden of proof 
here. However, earlier in his paper, Nelson 
acknowledges that there are serious difficul­
ties in trying to substantiate this claim to 
greater value for human life. He there con­
cludes that this leaves us with an inconclu­
sive relativism, but that is not the case. 
In doing painful, lethal research with ani­
mals, we are clearly adding to the burden of 
suffering and exploitation in the world. 
Unless this contribution to the negative side 
of the !!Oral ledger can be justified, such 
research ought not to be done. Consequently, 
if showing that human life is !!Orally !!Ore 
valuable than animal life is necessary to 
meet this burden of proof and if that claim 
of greater worth cannot be justified, then we 
are not left with relativism; we are left 
with the conclusion that we ought not to be 
exploiting animals in research. 
Thus, while I do appreciate Nelson's 
recognition of the !!Oral o:mplexities sur­
rounding therapuetic (for humans) research 
and testing which exploits animals and his 
attempt to give due concern to parents and 
their feelings as well as to animals and 
their needs, I still think that the core 
issue is that of the relative flOral worth of 
animal and human life and that unless our 
anthropocentric assumption that we are worth 
nore than they are can be !!Orally justified, 
such research with animals is L'TUll)ral and 
should not be participated in by people who 
are ooncerned to do what is norally right. 
JIM NELSON 
I am grateful to Will Aiken, Connie 
Kagan, and Steve Sapontzis for their willing­
ness to work through my paper with such care; 
I have learned a good deal about my topic by 
attending to their remarks. 
One thing I learned is that my paper 
needs to be clearer: I find that I am some­
times taken to be making assertions when I am 
actually arguing hypothetically, that I am 
. taken to be making one kind of comparison 
between human and non-humans when I am in 
fact making quite a different comparison, and 
especially, that the particular c..'Onditions 
under which I am portraying xenograft as 
justifialJle are misunderstood. I cannot sort 
all this out in the space alotted this re­
joinder, but I will try to be a bit plainer 
on some of these points. 
Sometimes the word "xenograft" appears 
in my paper as the name of an experimental 
medical procedure that occupies a place in 
the actual world: this procedure is frought 
with ethical difficulties of many kinds, in 
large part because it has so little thera­
peutic value. At other points in my paper, 
the word is used to refer to a hypothetical 
procedure that has great--and in some instan­
ces, unique--therapeutic value. Shifting to 
this possible world allows a particular sub­
set of the moral concerns occasioned by xeno­
graft to arise. It also suggests analogies 
between xenograft and less recherche kinds of 
medical therapies which also exploit animals. 
Thus, when Steve Sapontzis says that "it 
is simply false that xenografts are the only 
available procedure for saving an infant's 
life," he's questioning what I'm taking to be 
a stipulation; likewise, when Connie Kagan 
says that "xenograft does not save chil­
dren. " I am exploring the moral dimensions 
of a situation in which surgical responses to 
HLHS are as inadequate as they actually are, 
in which there is no cadaver which happens to 
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 Sapontzis conflates this idea with the 
notion that the lives of humans are rrorally 
more valuable than those of animals. But 
this doesn't follow at all. Some situation X 
can certainly be more harmful to individual s 
than to inmvidual r, without saying anything 
at all about the relative merit of x and r; 
it is clear, for instance, that a dry climate 
is a greater harm to a tuna than to a kitten, 
but this doesn't tell us anything about their 
respective moral wortll. 
Aiken, too, slides quickly from my sug­
gestion that death is a greater hann to hu­
mans to attribution to me the view that hu­
mans have greater luoral worth than non-hu­
mans. But even if we start playing out some 
of the reasons why death may be a greater 
harm to humans--say, because their lives are 
generally more richly satisfying or their 
projects morally more significant--the great­
er worth conclusion still won't follow. 
(Consider the morally valuable goals achieved 
by the NEr!. These may well outstrip those 
achieved by some humans, but I would not, on 
that ground alone, conclude that the NEH is 
morally more worthy than such humans.) 
But couldn't both Aiken and Sapontzis 
rejoin that, whether I talk about "rroral 
worth": or "extent of hann," the same criti­
cism applies: these are general points, not 
particular ones. If human lives are typical­
ly of greater moral significance than those 
of non-humans, and if there's a valid rroral 
principle enjoining us to increase the pre­
valence of what is morally worthy, then we 
ought to act to save humans; considerations 
of parental affection simply don 't enter into 
it. The same holds if we say rather that 
humans as such typically suffer greater harm 
by dying than do non-humans. In either case, 
Aiken would be right in saying that partial 
affections are largely beside the point. 
But I don't think that this is the case. 
Aiken guesses that I would endorse the claim 
that "it is plausible that the human species 
is superior in moral worth and thus members 
of this species should take precedence in 
conflict situations." But 1 m very troubled
'
by the inference here. Is it simply evident 
that greater moral worth dictates a resolu­
tion in its favor, independently of consider­
ations of partial affections? 
Answering "yes" would certainly run 
smack in the face of many people's moral 
intuitions. In life-or-death conflicts, in 
fact, we seem at least as comfortable making 
decisions on the grounds of certain kinds of 
special affections as we do deciding impar­
tially. Consider William Godwin's well-known 
discussion of the great writer, Archbishop 
Fenelon of Cambria, who is trapped in a burn­
ing tower along with his valet--a person of 
comparatively little account, apart from the 
fact that he is your father. You can save 
only one of the two men. Godwin, good utili­
tarian that he was, opted to save Fenelon. 
But many of us will make the other choice, 
and clearit is not  that we are wrong to do 
so. 
Cases like this indicate, I think, that 
certain key kinds of partialities are ex­
tremely morally significant--enough so to 
trump impartial assessments of worth. But 
can they be used to justify the decision in 
the xenograft case, where it is not simply a 
matter of saving one rather thall another but 
of saving one at tb.e expense of another? 
Mere difference in WO~l, or in degree 
of harm suffered, won 't justify using one for 
the ends of another; to do so, the magnitude 
of difference would have to be considerable 
indeed. But there are other relevant factors 
--the prevalence and character of partial 
affections--as revealed by the general dis­
sent from Godwin's resolution of the Fenelon 
case. 
The type of partial affection discussed 
in my paper--parental affection--is surely 
among the more morally significant there are. 
We are not here considering the affections of 
one friend for another, of an art lover for 
his/her objet d'art, nor even of Professor 
Aiken for his chimp. Exactly where the moral 
force of this kind of partial affection comes 
from, and exactly how it relates to spousal 
affections, filial affections, and so forth, 
is something that requires further investiga­
tion. But it does seem to me that the force 
is there, and that it is weighty. 
Impartial considerations, so far as 
can tell, are not such as to justify the use 
of baboons as spare parts bins for humans. 
But in the kind of situation I envisage in my 
paper, the moral force of partial considera­
tions, at least in conjunction with the sti­
pulated conditions, may justify a parent's 
accepting xenograft--and other therapies ex­
ploitative of animals--on behalf of his/her 
children. 
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